Apollo 204 Review Board activities Second interim report by Seamans, R. C., Jr.
E w s # NATIONAL AERONAUTKS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION W O  2-4155 
WASHINGTON,D .C. 20546 TELS wo 3-6925 
FOR RELEASE: IMMEDIATE 
February 15, 1967 
RELEASE NO: 67-28 
NOTE TO EDITORS: 
Deputy Administrator Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr. 
has given NASA Administrator James E. Webb a second 
report on the progress of the Apollo 204 Review Board 
activities. 
The Report has been reviewed with Senator Clinton 
B - Ariderson, Chairman, Senate Committee on Aeronautical 
and Space Sciences; Senator Margaret Chase Smith; and 
Representative George Miller, Chairman, House Committee 
on Science and Astronautics, and other committee members 
and staff 
The full report is attached. 
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATIOi4 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546 
OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR 
February 14, 1967 
MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. James E. Webb 
Administrator 
From: Robert C. Seamans, Jr. 
Deputy Administrator 
Subject: Further report on Apollo 204 Review Board Activities 
On February 10 I met with the Apollo 204 Review Board at KSC to 
discuss their progress in the investigation of the Apollo accident. 
The Board now has 21 panels established and operating, each with a 
specific assigned task, each chaired by a Government employee, and 
each reporting to a specific Board member. 
activity schedule has been established and is reviewed daily to 
ensure that milestones are being met or that scheduled adjustments 
are made as early as necessary. 
and integration of all the necessary activities, analyses, and 
studies. 
A detailed Review Board 
This permits close coordination 
In order to speed up the investigative effort, the Apollo 012 
spacecraft is being mapped in detail, using a 3-dimensional coor- 
dinate system to which all physical spacecraft elements can be 
referred. Complete photographic coverage is being maintained, color 
film being preferred since it permits more ready identification of 
components and their condition. Each photograph is cross-referenced 
to the master grid. 
The Board has implemented a data control system that permits a visual 
display, against a time-line background, of each step of the investi- 
gation. As spacecraft systems are examined and as their utilization 
in the 204 test is established, these are noted and color coded: at 
a glance, one can determine whether a system might have caused the 
accident or has proven to be non-contributory, and also whether a 
particular analysis is still underway or completed. This method of 
data control focuses on the critical areas requiring the greatest 
attention. 
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I reviewed a t  some length t h e  work and procedures of t he  panel t h a t  
i s  inves t iga t ing  the  o r ig in  and propagation of t h e  f i r e .  
work i s  f a r  from complete, I am s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  t h e  procedures they 
are following are w e l l  worked out.  
w i l l  give us as c l e a r  a view as can be obtained from the  evidence. 
The panel has begun by examining each poss ib le  combustible within the  
spacec ra f t ,  i t s  d i s t r i b u t i o n  and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  and i ts  proximity t o  
each poss ib le  i g n i t i o n  source. Such combustibles include both so l id s  
and l i qu ids .  A t  each s t e p  of spacecraf t  disassembly, panel members 
are c a r e f u l l y  removing both damaged and undamaged materials f o r  micro- 
ana lys i s  which, i n  t u r n ,  permits t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of t he  material 
t h a t  was burned. This allows a recons t ruc t ion  of t h e  f i n a l  location 
of a l l  combustibles i n  the  spacecraft  and w i l l  point up i r r e g u l a r i t i e s  
i n  t h i s  d i s t r i b u t i o n  i f  any exist., 
examined poin ts  t o  t h e  following: 
While t h e i r  
When t h i s  work is completed, it 
The physical evidence thus f a r  
F i r s t ,  it appears t he  f i r e  had considerable v a r i a t i o n  and 
d i r e c t i o n a l i t y ,  s ince  damage in  t h e  spacecraf t  ind ica tes  
d i f fe rences  of i n t e n s i t y  and timing. 
aluminum tubing handle has a hole burned through it indi -  
ca t ing  a temperature a t  t h a t  point of a t  l e a s t  1,400' F ,  
while i t s  nylon hinge wi th in  two inches of t h e  melted spot 
i s  r e l a t i v e l y  undamaged indica t ing  a temperature there  of 
less than 500' F. 
For example, an 
Second, t h e r e  is evidence t h a t  t he  f i r e  may have had more 
than one phase, but t h i s  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  prove s ince  t h e  
las t  phase would obscure t h e  evidence of t he  e a r l i e r .  One 
hypothesis, supported by t h e  cabin pressure h i s to ry ,  assumes 
a small, low-grade f i r e  whose hea t  was a t  f i r s t  l a rge ly  ab- 
sorbed by t h e  spacecraf t  s t r u c t u r e  and t h a t  was burning a t  
the  time of t h e  f i r s t  crew repor t ;  t h a t  f i r e  may have con- 
tinued f o r  as long as t e n  seconds. A more intense f i r e  may 
have then developed, causing t h e  rapid increase i n  cabin 
pressure.  
deple t ion  of oxygen. 
This f i r e  was probably then extinguished by the  
Other p e c u l i a r i t i e s  requi re  fu r the r  ana lys i s .  
wi th  t h e  ruptures  i n  t h e  spacecraft  and t h e  r o l e  of t h e  f ire 
i n  burning through i n t o  the space between the  inner and outer 
h u l l s .  
These dea l  
A t  t h i s  time, t h e r e  has been no determination as t o  t h e  source of t he  
i g n i t i o n  i t s e l f .  
. .  . 
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Additional information r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  progress of t h e  accident 
has been iden t i f i ed  and is  being analyzed. A recording from an 
onboard bio-sensor t h a t  appears r e l a t i v e l y  undamaged is  i n  t h e  
process of being read out a t  t h i s  time. Additional work t o  i n t e r -  
p r e t  a l l  background sounds on a high f i d e l i t y  recording obtained 
over t h e  S-band l i n k  is being ca r r i ed  o u t  i n  t h e  hope of gaining 
f u r t h e r  information on t h e  course of the f i r e .  I a l s o  reviewed 
wi th  t h e  physician who heads the  medical ana lys i s  panel t he  condi- 
t i o n  of t h e  personal e f f e c t s ,  s u i t s ,  and equipment of t he  crew as 
w e l l  as d a t a  ava i l ab le  on t h e i r  ac t ions  during t h e  course of t h e  
acc ident .  
though t h e  extent of s u i t  damage var ies ;  t h e  command p i l o t ' s  received 
t h e  g r e a t e s t  exposure t o  flame and the p i l o t ' s  t h e  least. 
It i s  now c l e a r  t h a t  a l l  three s u i t s  were burned through, 
Spacecraf t  disassembly is proceeding with g r e a t  care;  fo r  example, 
a f a l s e  f l o o r  with p lex ig lass  viewing po r t s  has been i n s t a l l e d  t o  
permit continued examination without t he  danger of d i s turb ing  physi- 
c a l  evidence. Current plans are f o r  t he  f i n a l  removal of t h e  space- 
c r a f t  t o  the  i n d u s t r i a l  area by t h e  end of t h i s  week. 
f o r  t h e  continued disassembly of both t h e  command module and serv ice  
module are i n  preparation and w i l l  be reviewed and approved by the  
Board before fu r the r  work i s  undertaken. It i s  important t o  note 
t h a t  no s i n g l e  spacecraf t  element i s  touched or removed f o r  ana lys i s  
without f u l l  Board approval and evaluation of its poss ib le  e f f e c t  on 
any of t h e  other on-going s t u d i e s  or analyses.  
Detailed plans 
Robert C. Seamans, J r .  
